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The Missouri Quality Jobs Program:
Rearranging the Deck Chairs
(And Throwing Some Overboard)
By Howard J. Wall
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Center for Economics and the
Environment is an economics
research center in the John W.
Hammond Institute for Free
Enterprise. Its focus includes policyoriented research on the business and
economic environment, particularly of
state and local economies.

CEE Policy Series
Number 18

2017

This paper is reprinted with
permission. It first appeared in the
Missouri Policy Journal, Number 1,
Fall/Winter 2013-14. It includes a
technical appendix not included in
the original version.

WALL

According to the Missouri
Department of Economic
Development (DED), the Missouri
Quality Jobs Program (MQJP) will
create 118 new jobs by 2020 for
each $1 million dollars in tax credits
awarded under the program. The
claimed sources of these job gains
are the direct increase in
employment at the firms receiving
the credits, and indirect increases at
other firms due to spinoff and
multiplier effects. Unfortunately, the
DED’s estimates for these effects
are based more on faith than on
evidence. First, the DED rather
naively assumes that all of the job
gains at the firms receiving tax
credits occur only because of the
credits. Second, the DED’s
projections of spinoff and multiplier
effects are generated with a
forecasting model that is incapable
of an accurate accounting of
negative substitution effects, such as
the fact that many of the new jobs
will be filled by people who are
already employed. This paper
summarizes new estimates of the
employment effects of the MQJP
using the actual, rather than the
assumed, experience of local
economies. What these estimates
show is that after an initial net
increase in employment following
the authorization of tax credits, the
net effect on employment becomes
negative by the second year after
authorization: Job gains in the
county receiving the tax credits
simply came at the expense of
neighboring counties, which tend to

lose more jobs than a recipient
county gains. Finally, by the fourth
year after authorization, the only
statistically significant effects of the
tax credits are job losses in
neighboring counties.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the
effectiveness the Missouri Quality
Jobs Program (MQJP), the declared
purpose of which is to “(f)acilitate
the creation of quality jobs by
targeted business projects” by
awarding tax credits in support of
qualifying projects.1 Tax credit
programs such as the MQJP are
quite common around the country
and are touted by state economic
development agencies as important
components of their development
efforts. Nonetheless, there is little
evidence that targeted tax credits
and similar policies are effective in
spurring economic development
and employment.2 In fact, one
recent study of employment tax
credits in Michigan found that the
state’s MEGA tax credits were
sometimes responsible for losses in
overall employment.3
For development tax credits to work
there must be some market failures,
such as imperfect capital markets or
agglomeration economies, that
create a gap between the actual and
efficient levels of local employment.
If there are such market failures, the
argument goes, then there might be
room for a properly structured
program that would use state money
to direct resources to close the
1
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employment gaps. Broadly speaking,
therefore, if a tax credit program
fails to deliver on promised jobs, it
was either because market failures
were not significant drags on
employment or because the
program was not structured
properly. On the heels of the
aforementioned history of failure of
these programs, significant
improvements have been made in
how they are administered.4 Most
notably, recent incarnations of state
tax credit programs are designed
with much greater accountability to
ensure a closer link between
promised and realized new jobs at
firms receiving the tax credits.
In many respects, the MQJP has
been ahead of the curve in terms of
accountability in that it includes
provisions for cancelling tax credits
in the event that job-creation
thresholds are not met, which it did
for 33 projects in 2012.5 In addition,
despite the extremely weak national
economy following the launch of
the MQJP, Missouri has so far
maintained program accountability,
thereby bucking the tendency for
governments to erode accountability
during difficult economic times.6
Given its relatively sound structure,
therefore, the success or failure of
the MQJP in delivering on
employment creation is likely
attributable to the extent to which it
is based on solid economic
efficiency grounds rather than on
the soundness of its administration.7
2. THE PROGRAM AND ITS
PROMISES
Tax credits have been awarded
under the MQJP since 2006 and are
distributed under three business
sub-categories—small/expanding,
technology, and high-impact—each
with its own set of eligibility criteria
and program benefits. By 2012, the
number and total value of tax-credit
WALL

Figure 1. Tax Credit Authorizations Under the Missouri Quality Jobs Program
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authorizations were both more than
double their 2006 levels, although
this trend was interrupted a great
deal by the national recession of
2008-09 (Figure 1).8 The increase in
the anticipated number of new jobs
at recipient firms roughly doubled
between 2006 and 2012, although,
as shown in Figure 2, the number of
actual new jobs is, so far, well short
of what had been anticipated when

the credits were authorized.
Obviously, the lag between the date
of authorization and the
actualization of new jobs accounts
for most of the shortfall for 201012, but even credits authorized in
2006-08 have fallen well short of
their promise. Perhaps the credits
from those years would look more
successful if it weren’t for the
recession of 2008-09.

Figure 2. New Jobs at Recipient Firms Under the Missouri Quality Jobs Program
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The most recent claims made by the
Missouri Department of Economic
Development (DED) about the
direct effects (new jobs at firms that
were awarded tax credits) and
indirect effects (spinoff and
multiplier effects) of the MQJP are
contained in the program’s 2012
annual report.9 At the end of 2012,
there were 220 active supported
projects, 73 of which were newly
authorized in 2012. The DED
claims that projects authorized
through 2011 were directly
responsible for 10,137 actual new
jobs by the end of 2012—with more
to come as the projects progress—
and that the 73 new projects are
anticipated to directly generate
another 7,054 new jobs in five years
time. After plugging their estimates
of direct job growth into their
forecasting model, DED arrives at
the claim that the tax credits
awarded through 2012 will have
created 50,096 jobs (directly and
indirectly) by 2020, or 118 jobs for
each million dollars in tax credits.
There are a number of reasons to
doubt the DED’s claims about the
effects of the MQJP. With regard to
direct job creation, the DED is
being naïve, or perhaps narcissistic,
in assuming that every new job
supported by the program exists
only because of the program and
that the eventual number of direct
jobs created is the same as the
number claimed when the tax
credits were authorized. These
assumptions fly in the face of logic
and the evidence for similar
programs.10 Perhaps even more
absurd is how the DED presumes
that none of the new jobs are filled
by workers who were already
employed elsewhere in Missouri.11
As for the broader indirect effects,
the DED relies on the belief that
the reshuffling of employment that
occurs between subsidized and
unsubsidized firms must be greatly
WALL

outweighed by large spinoff and
multiplier effects. This belief is
embedded into the DED’s Regional
Economic Models, Inc. (REMI)
forecasting model which, despite a
veneer of quantitative detachment,
is simply a mathematical
specification of the DED’s prior
beliefs about how the economy
works.12 More precisely, the primary
sources of the indirect gains
predicted by the REMI forecasting
model are illusive multiplier effects
that are believed to dominate the
substitution effects across firms and
communities.13 This notion is, to say
the least, extremely controversial
among economists in that regional
forecasting models are afflicted with
many of the same problems as the
outdated national forecasting
models from the 1960s and 1970s
they are based on.14
To illustrate the difficulty, if not the
impossibility, of modeling the
indirect effects of tax credits,
consider a firm that receives a $1
million credit to support a new
factory that will eventually employ
50 workers. Even if we accept that
all 50 of the jobs at the recipient
firm would not have existed without
the tax credit, it’s not possible say
anything useful without knowing
where the workers came from to fill
the new jobs. Unless they all came
from the ranks of the nonemployed
or from out of state, some of the 50
new jobs are simply substitutes for
jobs that already existed. If the jobs
were simply shifted from other
Missouri employers, then it is
necessary to know what happened
to those firms. Because the subsidy
to one employer makes it difficult
for unsubsidized employers to
compete for local workers, these
unsubsidized firms might downsize,
shut down, or relocate, thereby
further eroding the alleged direct job
gains.

These substitution effects are not
captured very well, if at all, by the
DED’s forecasting model.
According to the DED’s model,
however, these unknown and
unaccounted for substitution effects
will be more than offset by spinoff
and multiplier effects. Fortunately, it
is no longer necessary to rely on the
DED’s claims about the current and
future effects of the program
because the MQJP has been in place
for several years. It is, therefore,
possible to compare actual
employment outcomes in Missouri
against those promised by the
MQJP.
3. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
As a practical matter, it is not
possible to trace the various
employment effects of a tax credit
authorization back their source, so it
is necessary to instead look at
aggregate employment. Therefore, I
used data on county-level private
employment for Missouri counties
for 1998-2011, with the objective of
identifying statistical patterns
between levels of employment and
the amount of tax credits received
by firms in the counties.15 To detect
these patterns, I estimated baseline
levels of employment, controlling
for the business cycle and countylevel trends. Any deviations from
these baselines that are related to
the receipt of MQJP tax credits
might then be attributed to the
program. County economies do not
operate in isolation, so I also looked
for the effects that a county might
rxperience because firms in
neighboring counties received tax
credits, and whether a county is in a
broader metropolitan area. Note
that my estimates are of the net
effects of tax credits and do not
distinguish between direct, indirect,
spinoff and multiplier effects.
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Figure 3 illustrates the average fiveyear effects of tax credits under the
MQJP. These effects were obtained
by applying the estimated effects
described above to the actual
allocation of tax credits across
Missouri counties.16 In the figure,
the solid bars are the employment
effects on counties whose firms
received the credits, the dashed bars
are the effects on the receiving
counties’ neighbors, and the solid
line is the net effect. Each of these
is measured as the average effect of
$1 million dollars in tax credits.
According to Figure 3, tax credits
led to a net increase in state
employment only during the year of
authorization and the following
year. Specifically, in the year of
authorization, tax credits led to 128
more jobs per $1 million in the
recipient counties, but a loss of 110
jobs per $1 million in neighboring
counties. In the year following
authorization, recipient counties and
their neighbors both tended to see
increased employment: 249 and 82
jobs per $1 million, respectively.
Beyond this initial start-up period,
WALL

Figure 3. The Effect of Tax Credits by Authorization Year
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however, average job gains in
receiving counties were more than
offset by job losses in neighboring
counties; the net effects were losses
of 42 and 50 jobs per $1 million in
tax credits during the second and
third years after authorization. By
the fourth year after authorization,
there were no statistically significant
effects on the recipient counties’
employment, but neighbors tended
to have lost 85 jobs per $1 million in
tax credits.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The MQJP has been in place long
enough to obtain statistical evidence
of its effects on the communities
with firms receiving tax credits
under the program. In the short
run—the first two years—tax
credits are associated with job gains
in the recipient county and its
neighbors. Over the medium run
(the next two years), however, the
recipient county gains employment
only at the expense of its neighbors,
and there is a net loss of jobs. At the
beginning of the long run—the
fourth year after authorization—
there are no longer any significant
job gains in the recipient county, but

Net Effects

the market distortions created by
the tax credits mean that there are
still significant job losses in
neighboring counties.
It’s not possible given the data
available to estimate what happens
beyond this early stage of the long
run, but it is difficult to imagine that
the trend reverses itself to result in
anything close to the DED’s
projection of 118 new jobs per
million dollars of tax credits. The
more likely best-case scenario is that
the employment distortions
eventually work themselves out and
the net effect of the tax credits
approximates zero.
Howard Wall is professor of economics;
director of the Hammond Institute for Free
Enterprise; and senior research fellow in
the Center for Economics and the
Environment at Lindenwood University.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
EMPIRICAL MODEL
My data set uses annual private
employment for 1998-2011 for all
counties in Missouri from the
Census Bureau’s County Business
Patterns. It is a balanced panel of
114 counties in which the
independent city of St. Louis is
included as a county and Worth
County is excluded because of
missing data. Tax credit data are
converted to 2011 dollars using the
CPI deflator from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and include all tax
credits that were authorized,
including those that were
subsequently canceled for failing to
meet the program’s performance
criteria.
My primary interest is in deviations
from baseline employment that are
due to the effects of tax credits,
which can affect employment over
many years and have different
effects over time. To account for
this, the specification allows for
employment in a given year to be
related to the value of the tax credit
awarded during that year and during
each of the previous five years
(which, given the data set, is the
maximum lag). Analogous variables
are also included to capture the
effects of tax credits received by
neighboring counties. To eliminate
the effects of fluctuations in
employment due to the business
cycle, my dependent variable is
county-level shares of state
employment. To control for
changes in county employment
shares that are unrelated to the
MQJP, I assume that each county
has its own quadratic trend. Note
that my estimates look at the net
effects of tax credits and do not
distinguish between direct, indirect,
spinoff, or multiplier effects.

WALL

The effectiveness of tax credits
might differ a great deal on the
extent to which the labor markets in
neighboring counties are integrated
with one another. Many Missouri
counties are part of larger
economically integrated entities: 17
are in one of two large metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs), another 17
are in one of six small MSAs, and
ten are in micropolitan areas (μSAs)
with more than one county.
Counties within these entities are, by
definition, economically integrated,
so I account for the possibility that
tax credits have different effects on
them than on nonmetro counties.
Finally, the specification also
accounts for border effects to
control for the fact that Missouri’s
two large MSAs contain substantial
areas in other states and that 46 of
Missouri’s counties are on the state
border.
Given the considerations outlined
above, I specify Eit, county i’s
relative employment at time t a
E it   0 i  1i t  2 i t 2
5

  (  j   j S i   j L i   j B i )C it j
j 0
5

  (  j   j S i   j L i   j B i )N it j
j 0

  it .

(1)

In (1), Cit is the real amount of tax
credits authorized for firms in
county i in year t and Nit is the
corresponding measure for county
i’s neighbors. To differentiate the
effects of tax credits across types of
counties, there are three interaction
dummies for each of Cit and Nit: Si
equals one if the county is in a small
MSA or a μSA composed of more
than one county, Li equals one if the
county is in one of the state’s two
large MSAs, and Bi equals one if the
county borders another state. The
possible lags in the effects of tax

credits are captured by including the
levels of tax credits over a six-year
period, with the year of
authorization denoted as j = 0.
Because (1) includes lags in the
effects of tax credits, and because of
the wide disparity in employment
shares across counties, the
estimation allows for autocorrelated
errors and is corrected for
heteroskedasticity, respectively. To
obtain estimates with these
corrections, I estimate expression
(1) using Feasible Generalized Least
Squares.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The estimation results for the
unrestricted version of equation (1)
are provided in Table 1, which, for
space considerations, does not
include the estimates of the 228
county-level trend coefficients or
the 114 county-specific intercepts. A
set of alternative results under
various restrictions on the
interaction terms in (1) are provided
in the appendix. It should be noted
at the outset that all of the estimated
effects for the fifth year after
authorization are based on very few
observations: Only nine counties
received tax credits in 2006, so there
are only nine observations of the
effects of tax credits in the fifth year
after authorization. For the most
part, therefore, these estimates can
be safely ignored, although they
need to be obtained to guard against
estimation bias.
The effects in the first column of
Table 1 are for a baseline county
that is not in a metro area and does
not border another state. For these
counties, tax credits have positive
and statistically significant effects on
employment in the year of
authorization through the third year
after authorization. In subsequent
years, however, the effects are
statistically no different from zero.
5
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Table 1. Base Estimation: Dependent Variable = County Relative Employment
Non-Metro
Effects of Own Credits
Authorization year
First year after authorization
Second year after
authorization
Third year after
authorization
Fourth year after
authorization
Fifth year after
authorization
Effects of Neighbors’ Credits

Small Metro

Large Metro

Border

θ0,…,θ5
0.0046 *
(0.0020)
0.0090 *
(0.0028)
0.0062 †
(0.0034)
0.0099 *
(0.0043)
0.0050
(0.0042)
-0.0014
(0.0659)

ω0,…,ω5
-0.0082
(0.0068)
0.0049
(0.0104)
0.0011
(0.0139)
-0.0259 †
(0.0157)
-0.0181
(0.0160)
-0.1152
(0.1371)

λ0,…,λ5
-0.0017
(0.0053)
-0.0091
(0.0068)
-0.0048
(0.0070)
0.0008
(0.0087)
-0.0011
(0.0098)
-0.0005
(0.0655)

κ0,…,κ5
-0.0056
(0.0036)
-0.0047
(0.0047)
-0.0036
(0.0058)
-0.0114
(0.0073)
-0.0078
(0.0088)
0.0165
(0.0166)

γ0,…,γ5

δ0,…,δ5

υ0,…,υ5

π0,…,π5

Authorization year

-0.0013 *
0.0024*
0.0000
0.0020
(0.0003)
(0.0007)
(0.0010)
(0.0017)
First year after authorization
-0.0023 *
0.0017†
0.0030 *
0.0044 *
(0.0004)
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
(0.0021)
Second year after
-0.0022 *
-0.0034*
0.0001
0.0016
authorization
(0.0005)
(0.0014)
(0.0018)
(0.0025)
Third year after
-0.0023 *
-0.0065*
0.0027
0.0026
authorization
(0.0006)
(0.0017)
(0.0022)
(0.0030)
Fourth year after
-0.0002
-0.0088*
-0.0023
-0.0015
authorization
(0.0006)
(0.0017)
(0.0033)
(0.0041)
Fifth year after
-0.0029
0.0320*
0.0063
-0.0027
authorization
(0.0018)
(0.0103)
(0.0049)
(0.0062)
The estimation includes county fixed effects and county-specific quadratic trends, which
are not reported here. Estimation is performed using Feasible Generalized Least Squares
with corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Statistical significance at the 5
percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by “*” and “†”, respectively. Data are annual
for 114 Missouri counties covering 1998-2011.

In contrast, employment in nonmetro counties tends to be reduced
by the tax credits received by
neighboring counties. The neighbor
effects for the fourth and fifth year
after authorization are not
statistically significant, however.
Figure A1 illustrates the effects of
one million dollars in tax credits on
a non-metro county and its
neighbors. To calculate the effects
illustrated by Figure A1, recall that
county employment is measured as a
fraction of state employment and
note that over the period 2006-11 a
percentage point of employment
was, on average, 22,232 jobs. The
WALL

marginal effect of one million
dollars of tax credits is, therefore,
22,232 times the estimated
coefficient for the relevant variable.
Also note that the neighbor effects
reported in Table 1 indicate the
marginal effects of neighbors’ tax
credits on only one county, so the
full effect on neighbors is the
relevant coefficient times 3.42, the
average number of neighbors for
counties that received tax credits.
For the year of authorization and
the following three years, the effects
on a county and its neighbors are
statistically significant although, as is
apparent from the figure, the large
positive effects on the recipient

county is usually cancelled out by
roughly comparable job losses in
neighboring counties. The solid line
in the figure represents the net
employment effect for each year,
and is small and positive for three of
them, rising to 45 jobs by the third
year after authorization. By the
fourth year after authorization
neither the recipient county nor its
neighbors see a statistically
significant effect on employment
because of the tax credits.
It’s not possible to know the precise
sources of the job gains and losses
illustrated in Figure A1 because they
include the direct gains at recipient
firms, substitution effects on other
firms, and spinoff and multiplier
effects. The results do, however,
illustrate that one county’s gains are
likely at the expense of other local
economies, and not by attracting
workers out of unemployment or by
generating large multiplier effects.
The importance of these crosscounty effects is highlighted further
by the large and statistically
significant negative neighbor effects
for counties in μSAs and small
MSAs.
The closer integration of counties in
μSAs and small MSAs mean that the
negative effects of tax credits on a
county’s neighbors are significantly
larger than are illustrated in Figure
A1. During the authorization year
and the year following it, a county
within a small metro area tends to
see an additional boost in
employment when firms in one of
its neighbors receive tax credits.
Perhaps this is because the entire
metro area is participating in
construction-related activities for
the supported projects.
Subsequently, however, the
neighbor sees increasingly large
negative effects that are in addition
to the non-metro neighbor effects
already described. In contrast, there
6
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Figure A1. Employment Effects for a Non-Metro County
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is little additional neighbor effect
when the county is in a large MSA
other than in the year after
authorization. Perhaps this should
be expected because the smallness
of μSAs and MSAs means that
neighbor effects will be more
obvious statistically. That is, the
metro-area neighbor effect might be
highly diluted in large metro areas
such as Kansas City and St. Louis,
which have 16 and 17 counties,
respectively.
The total effects in terms of
employment per million dollars of
tax credits are illustrated by Figure
3. The figure shows the own effects,
the neighbor effects, and the net
effects by the number of years since
the tax credits were authorized. To
obtain it, I applied the marginal
effects described above to the tax
credits that were authorized through
2011. Note that I used only the
coefficients that were statistically
significant at the 10 percent level or
better. I then aggregated the
estimated effects on 2011
employment according to the year in
which the credits were authorized
WALL

Net Effect

and whether the credits were
received by a county or by its
neighbors.

of tax credits under the program.
The second set of restricted results
show the statistical importance of
including metro effects to avoid
biasing the estimates of the rest of
the model. Specifically, the positive
and statistically significant effects of
counties’ own credits for the year of
authorization and the third year
following authorization would not
be obtained, and the coefficients on
the neighbor effects would be
reduced by one third to one half.
Finally, even though only one of the
border coefficients in the
unrestricted estimation was
statistically significant, if it were
assumed that the effect of being on
the border was zero, the positive
effect found for counties’ own tax
credits would be reduced for all
years of authorization that are
statistically significant in the
unrestricted estimation.

ALTERNATIVE
SPECIFICATIONS
Equation (1) allows for a variety of
employment effects in addition to
those on the counties receiving tax
credits: (i) neighbor effects, (ii)
metro effects, and (iii) border
effects. I tested alternative
specifications that restrict the effects
of these categories to zero. The
results of three restricted
estimations, each of which excludes
one category of variables, are
summarized in Table 2.
The first restricted model assumes
that there are no neighbor effects
and this restriction has little effect
on the rest of the estimates, even
though neighbor effects were found
to be statistically significant in the
unrestricted estimation. This result
is readily apparent from a
comparison of Table 1 to Table 2
and indicates there was no localized
spatial correlation in the allocation
7
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Table 2. Alternative Estimation Results: Dependent Variable = County Relative Employment
No Neighbor Effects
No Metro Area Effects
No Border Effects
Non-Metro
Non-Metro
Non-Metro
Small
Large
Border
Border
Small
Large
Metro
Metro
Effects of Own Credits
θ0,…,θ5
ωMetro
λ0,…,λ5
κ0,…,κ5
θ0,…,θ5
κ0,…,κ5
θ0,…,θ5
ωMetro
λ0,…,λ5
0,…,ω5
0,…,ω5
Authorization year
0.0045*
-0.0047
-0.0018
-0.0056
0.0025
-0.0041
0.0023
-0.0057
-0.0042
(0.0021)
(0.0053)
(0.0042)
(0.0035)
(0.0021)
(0.0055)
(0.0015)
(0.0068)
(0.0061)
Year after authorization
0.0092*
0.0073
-0.0094†
-0.0055
0.0091*
-0.0057
0.0073*
0.0065
-0.0116
(0.0030)
(0.0101)
(0.0055)
(0.0046)
(0.0029)
(0.0067)
(0.0021)
(0.0104)
(0.0077)
Second year after
0.0067†
0.0042
-0.0077
-0.0048
0.0062†
-0.0015
0.0055*
0.0011
-0.0051
authorization
(0.0035)
(0.0134)
(0.0056)
(0.0056)
(0.0035)
(0.0080)
(0.0024)
(0.0140)
(0.0079)
Third year after
0.0096*
-0.0242
-0.0013
-0.0113
0.0043
-0.0031
0.0056†
-0.0228
-0.0042
authorization
(0.0044)
(0.0159)
(0.0072)
(0.0069)
(0.0043)
(0.0092)
(0.0031)
(0.0158)
(0.0096)
Fourth year after
0.0045
-0.0164
-0.0025
-0.0086
0.0044
0.0012
0.0033
-0.0177
-0.0005
authorization
(0.0043)
(0.0162)
(0.0079)
(0.0083)
(0.0043)
(0.0111)
(0.0035)
(0.0161)
(0.0104)
Fifth year after
-0.0094
-0.1112
0.0072
0.0129
0.0066
0.0116
0.0195
-0.1359
-0.0123
authorization
(0.0625)
(0.1358)
(0.0623)
(0.0144)
(0.0068)
(0.0149)
(0.0649)
(0.1369)
(0.0660)
Effects of Neighbors’ Credits
γ0,…,γ5
π0,…,π5
γ0,…,γ5
δ0,…,δ5
υ0,…,υ5
Authorization year
-0.0005*
0.0018
-0.0012*
0.0023*
0.0021
(0.0002)
(0.0019)
(0.0003)
(0.0007)
(0.0018)
Year after authorization
-0.0007*
0.0042†
-0.0020*
0.0016
0.0029
(0.0003)
(0.0023)
(0.0004)
(0.0010)
(0.0022)
Second year after
-0.0010*
0.0004
-0.0022*
-0.0033*
0.0013
authorization
(0.0003)
(0.0028)
(0.0004)
(0.0014)
(0.0030)
Third year after
-0.0016*
0.0021
-0.0022*
-0.0065*
0.0022
authorization
(0.0004)
(0.0033)
(0.0005)
(0.0016)
(0.0033)
Fourth year after
-0.0003
-0.0043
-0.0003
-0.0087*
-0.0027
authorization
(0.0004)
(0.0043)
(0.0005)
(0.0016)
(0.0044)
Fifth year after
-0.0006
-0.0008
-0.0028†
0.0308*
0.0012
authorization
(0.0010)
(0.0061)
(0.0017)
(0.0102)
(0.0061)
The estimation includes county fixed effects and county-specific quadratic trends, which are not reported here. Estimation is performed using
Feasible Generalized Least Squares with corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent
levels are indicated by “*” and “†”, respectively. Data are annual for 114 Missouri counties covering 1998-2011.
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